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Schelling, seine Bedeutung fur eine Philosophie der Natur und der
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Zurich, 1979. Ed. by Ludwig Hasler. (Problemata, 91). Stuttgart-Bad
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3772808131 pbk.

This volume contains the papers delivered at the International
Schelling Conference in Zurich, 1979, on the occasion of the 125th
anniversary of Schelling's death. The theme of the conference, as
enunciated by the editor, was "taking Schelling seriously." It is
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Hasler's view that our age, which has learned by experience that both
idealism and materialism are dead-end world-views, has much to learn
from the philosopher who early in his career insisted that the human is
just as much a natural being as a spiritual one, and who late in his
career attempted to make human freedom the determinative power in
history, both on a human and on a cosmic scale. Accordingly, the
conference was organized around two themes, nature and history, and
was divided into three colloquia, the first considering Schelling's early
philosophy of nature, its relation to empirical science, and its
philosophical significance. The second colloquium considered the large
theme of Schelling's view of history, and discovered three crucial
transitions in his career-long meditation on that theme, (1) a turn
from the interpretation of freedom as human reason to a scheme
wherein freedom pertains to divine history, the territory of mythology
and revelation, (2) a turn from an idealistic approach to history
towards a materialistic one, and (3) a general transition from absolute
philosophy to a philosophy of finitude. A third colloquium, devoted to
Schelling's political philosophy, confined itself to the period of his
collaboration with Hegel in Jena. While Hasler acknowledges the
superiority of Hegel's political philosophy, especially in his concrete
grasp of economics, jurisprudence and politics, he notes that both
philosophers entered upon the path of philosophy through their
respective attempts to criticize religion as an ideological power. I will
mention here only those articles which state new views in Schelling
scholarship or which would be particularly of interest to students of
Hegel.
Many of the contributors were not as sanguine as Hasler about
Schelling's philosophical relevance; they seem, in fact, to voice a
philosophical bad conscience about their interest in Schelling. Walter
Schulz, who, a quarter-century earlier in Bad-Ragaz, put forth his
interpretation of Schelling's late philosophy as 'the completion of
German Idealism', freely admits that Hegel is vastly more important
for our current philosophical situation, both because of the difficulty
and conceptual power of his logic and because of the closeness of his
analysis of the relations of society and the political state to
contemporary problems. Schulz acknowledges that the essentially
theological orientation of Schelling's speculation make it difficult to
appropriate today, particularly because that theological orientation
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took the form of an attempted reconstruction of the transcendent
activity of God (no minor speculative task!), and is counterbalanced, if
not contradicted, by the persistent tendency to model his concept of
the deity upon human nature ("Macht und Ohnmacht der Vernunft,"
pp. 23-24).
The first colloquium considered Schelling's philosophy of nature.
Hermann Krings offered the following succinct observations about that
endeavor: (1) Schelling's interest in nature and in scientific
investigation is original, though provoked by Kant. (2) Schelling
always pursued philosophy of nature in the context of a grand systemstrategy, namely that inorganic and organic nature, nature and human
nature, the human and the divine, all be comprehended through one
and the same principle. (3) Schelling never confused the speculative
task of a philosophy of nature with the principles and methods of
empirical science, though he was widely accused in his time of doing
"armchair science." (4) He actually achieved a remarkable congruence
between his speculative philosophy and the concepts which occupied
scientific attention around 1800, e.g. electricity-theory, galvanism,
irritability as the physiological foundation of sensibility. (5) Ultimately,
nature-philosophy had no impact on the empirical sciences except the
one appropriate to any philosophical meditation on the practice and
the content of the sciences, namely to draw attention to the principles
of scientific investigation and to their impact on how humans perceive
themselves and their world. (pp. 73-76).
Dietrich von Engelhardt fills in the details of Krings' outline.
Schelling's vision of nature, on his view, is determined by four
metaphysical theses, (1) the identity of spirit and nature, (2) nature as
an evolutionary manifestation of an original involution, (3) nature as
law-giver unto itself, (4) nature as a teleological dialectic, a unity-intension between productivity and product. As a result of these
commitments, and especially the last, Schelling came to view the
whole universe as a global manifestation of the unconscious teleology
exhibited in the living organism and to accord special significance to
the interpretation of biological phenomena. Engelhardt recounts in
detail the stormy reception accorded nature-philosophy between 1798
and 1807, which culminated in Schelling's decision to forego any
further publications on the subject and to communicate his views on it
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only "in live lecture, to the true initiates" (p. 84). He notes too that
Hegel's philosophy of nature came on the scene too late (1817, 1827,
1830) to attract serious attention; Schelling's silence on the subject,
enthusiasts' distorted versions thereof, and the general rejection of the
endeavor by the scientific community produced inattention to Hegel's
thoroughgoing and more detailed pursuit of the same project (pp. 7798).
Reinhard Low throws further light on the systematic significance
of Schelling's philosophy of nature by noting the emphasis it placed on
the supposed irreducible nature of quality. The progress of science
itself in the 19th Century proved the reverse, that qualities or
properties are but the appearances of fundamentally quantitative
processes, and hence are both reducible and constructible. In contrast
to the world-view suggested by mathematical physics, Schelling's
concern was basically ideological, attempting to reconcile science with
the ideology of humanism. Löw pursues the agonizing question of
spirit versus matter as far as Nietzsche and into our own century,
noting that either "man himself becomes a piece of
anthropomorphism" or that the social and ethical dimensions of human
life must somewhat arbitrarily be ceded philosophical priority (pp. 99106).
Nelly Tsouyopoulos and Richard Toellner contribute
exceptionally interesting papers on Schelling's impact upon
contemporary medicine, which was in severe conceptual disarray at
the end of the 18th Century, with clinical practice and pathology
divorced from one another, and mechanistic and vitalistic methods of
biological explanation competing for attention. Tsouyopoulos shows
how Schelling brought together John Brown's radically naturalistic
understanding of human life, Fichte's intuition that activity and
passivity are equally modes of the subject's action, and Franz
Roschlaub's concept of "irritability" - roughly the symbiotic dependence
of an organism upon its environment - to form a concept of the
organism in which a dialectic of quantity and quality replaces any such
"occult" notion as "vital force." This, in turn, allows a naturalistic
pathology to emerge, one which views illness not as some supposed
"spiritual" event, but as one of the modes of an organism's natural
adjustment to the demands of its environment (pp. 107-116). Toellner
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documents Schelling's impact on the scientific world with two histories
from the so-called Romantic School of medicine, that of Jan Purkyne
(1787-1868) and K.E. von Bauer (1792-1876). Competent empiricists
in their respective researches into physiology and embryology, both
men sought to understand nature as a whole on the model supplied by
Schelling's philosophy of nature, and both envisioned medicine (to use
Bauer's words) as a "cooperation of observation and reflection" (pp.
117-129).
The second colloquium, devoted to Schelling's philosophy of
history, is the most diffuse of the three, since all participants agree
that for Schelling "history" was a fundamental problem and a turningpoint rather than an isolated territory which could once and for all be
mapped onto a systematic model. Hans Michael Baumgartner (pp.
175-192) views Schelling's whole philosophy as a dialectic of the
claims of reason and the claims of history, whose three phases
constitute (1) an unsuccessful attempt to think the identity of reason
and history, (2) an unsuccessful attempt to deduce history from
reason, and (3) the overcoming of reason itself or its self-finitization in
the face of history. All this rather reminds one of the talk of ideology,
the social history of concepts, and the cultural "nesting" of theory
which hermeneutical philosophers and apostate analysts purvey in our
day, but Xavier Tilliette (pp. 193-202), Walter Ehrhardt (pp. 239-244)
and Horst Fuhrmans (pp. 227-231) all remind the reader that
Schelling's vision of history is a thoroughly religious one. Manfred Buhr
(pp. 233-237) goes so far as to claim that Schelling's philosophy
represents a transition from "rational history" to "historical
irrationality," a "speculative Good Friday" in which both reason and
history lose their lives. The "bad conscience" experienced by
philosophers dealing with such material today is explicitly addressed
by Hans Jorg Sandkiihler (pp. 213-225) who finds in such speculation
the proclamation of a normative idea of progress totally unrelated to
the vicissitudes of social-economic-political existence. Schelling's
philosophy of history, he concludes, hides the real subject of history.
The third colloquium, on Schelling's and Hegel's early political
philosophy, features both close textual scholarship and vigorous
interpretive debate. The controversy turns on Hegel's 1802/03 System
of Ethical Life, with its obvious dependence on Schelling's method of
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"potentiation," and on the lack of an authentic political philosophy in
Schelling's writings after 1799. Walter Ch. Zimmerle (pp. 255-278)
notes two shortcomings in the existing literature on Hegel's early years
in Jena; scholars either simply assert Hegel's dependence on Schelling
without bringing the Schellingian elements to bear on what Hegel says,
or they simply focus on how Hegel's early concept, say, of society, fits
into his mature vision of the philosophical system, without at all
looking to his procedure or method. Zimmerle contends there is a
close connection between the double-subsumption methodology of the
System of Ethical Life and Schelling's method of potentiation as spelled
out in the 1802 Further Expositions from the System of Philosophy,
suggesting that in 1802 Hegel did not view the three-potency schema
as a lifeless formalism, but as an analytic-discursive method for
depicting the productive activity of the Absolute itself. While we cannot
present his exposition in full detail, he indeed offers aid to the puzzled
reader of Ethical Life by suggesting that therein universality
corresponds to intuition (as in the paradigm case of intellectual
intuition of the Absolute), while particularity corresponds to the
conceptual, that is, the divisive, discursive and finite cognition
proffered by mere concepts. What is controversial about Kimmerle's
interpretation is his assertion that a tension between cognizing
cognition and cognized cognition motivates a "dialectic" in the 1802/03
text, and thus explains the outbreak of negativity in the section
entitled "Absolute Freedom and Destruction." Heinz Kimmerle has
argued that this section of the manuscript signals a complete break
with the Schellingian method of potentiation.
Ludwig Siep (pp. 279-288) vigorously advances an opposite and
more orthodox (at least to Hegelians) interpretation which insists that
Hegel employs Schelling's method of potencies only to cancel nonethical relations, and that within the ethical sphere the relations are
developed purely in terms of the negativity of the absolute concept.
Siep rightly notes the static and organic nature of Schelling's powerschema, which is in sharp contrast to Hegel's ascending and negating
hierarchy of family / war / society, He also notes Hegel's tendency in
1800-1802 to look to "Life" as the overarching category, which sharply
contrasts with the mechanistic view of the state Schelling presented in
the 1796197 New Deduction of Natural Rights, Both Zimmerle's and
Siep's views are well-documented and well-argued, and they form a
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basis for a more careful discussion of Hegel's development from 18011803, They will certainly be of use to anyone interested in either the
form or content of Ethical Life.
I have only been able to provide a cursory overview of the
colloquia's more interesting papers. Two of the invited papers which
open the volume are worthy of careful attention, Walter Schulz's
"Macht und Ohnmacht der Vernunft," and Werner Marx's "Das Wesen
des Bosen und seine Rolle in der Geschichte," This volume contains
much fine scholarship and provocative reflection for the scholar
interested in Schelling and Hegel, but it is especially useful for those
interested in exploring how Hegel took and transformed the views he
found around him in the course of his philosophical maturation.
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